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 The expression “vertical marketing system” is no longer part of the mainstream 
channels vocabulary used by most researchers.  It has been replaced by such 
expressions as “value chain analysis”, with its related terms such as downstream 
and upstream analysis.  And much of what is referred to as “strategic alliances” 
either with suppliers or distributors is in reality another way of describing and 
studying vertical marketing systems.  As a result, this research will henceforth use 
the original term coined by McCammon almost 30 years ago and our 





 The basic objective of this research is to understand and explain how vertical marketing 
systems function in the food distribution, especially for consumer packaged goods purchased 
mainly in supermarkets, through the political economy framework (Stern and Reve, 1980).  Vertical 
marketing systems theory has yet to be updated to take into account the theoretical and empirical 
contributions offered by the political economy framework (Dwyer and Oh 1987, 1988; Robicheaux 
and Coleman 1994).  Thus, the study contributes to our understanding of internal political economy 
through the dimensions of transactional form (i.e., locus of decision making and administrative 
procedures) and interorganizational climate (i.e., cooperation and trust). 
 
 So far, a number of authors have examined one or more aspects of this frame empirically.  
However, very few of these studies have been concerned with the differences in the structure and 
functioning of vertical marketing systems (Brown, 1981; Dwyer and Oh, 1988; Etgar 1976).  In the 
words of Kaynak and Savitt (1984, p. 283), "there is much to be done within domestic marketing 
systems...".  A similar concern was expressed by Dwyer and Oh (1988, p. 32), to the effect that: 
 
 It is vital that empirical work on the structure and processes of interfirm 
relationships be extended to other channel forms in different industries...  We can 
learn much about the political and economic phenomena of the diverse 
contractually integrated systems evident, for example, in the drug, grocery, and 
industrial supplies and equipment sectors. 
 Corporate chains, voluntary groups and unaffiliated retailers also referred to as corporate, 
contractual and administered vertical marketing systems are the main entity under study (Stern, El-
Ansary and Coughlan, 1995).  More specifically, the research pursues the following objectives : 
 
 to empirically validate the corporate, contractual and administered vertical marketing 
systems typology proposed over 30 years ago but has so far never been tested empirically in 
grocery distribution; 
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vertical marketing systems; and 
 
 to test for differences in interorganizational climate among corporate, contractual and 
administered vertical marketing in grocery distribution. 
 Answering these objectives are important in that they will improve our understanding of the 
interorganizational links retailers have with their grocery distributors and corresponding managerial 
requirements needed to manage such vertical arrangements.  The food distribution market selected 
for this study was the province of Quebec.  While the retail food distribution structure in the 
province differs significantly from the rest of Canada, it is precisely for this reason why this 
geographic area was selected.  The food distribution maybe atypical relative to other markets in 
Canada.  For example, corporate chains market share is only at 25.5 %, well below the Canadian 
average of 53.9 % (Canadian Grocer, January-February 1996).  Independents affiliated retailers 
(i.e., contractual arrangements) dominate the market with approximately 62.8 % of retail food sales. 
 The remaining food sales are realised by independent unaffiliated retailers with 11.7 %.  This 
market is now in transition as more corporate chains are grabbing market share from other types of 
distribution outlets (from 19.9 % in 1991 to 25.5 % in 1995).  As a result the market provides an 





 Vertical marketing systems differ from conventional distribution channels (McCammon, 
1970; Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan 1995).  What follows next merely highlights some major 
points of comparison pertinent to the study and is not intended to be a comprehensive review of this 
domain of marketing channels.  Conventional distribution channels are composed of a set of 
independent businesses where transactions are coordinated through a process of negotiation on one 
or more independent, vertically aligned markets.  The number of players on each market is fairly 
high, and the businesses themselves are usually small, with no real negotiating power. More 
specifically, retailers are small, with little training and few qualified staff, and a financial structure 
that is often deficient.  Their investments, few in number, are directed solely at reducing operating 
expenses or improving the firm's financial situation on the market.  In such a situation, purchasing 
and sales conditions are negotiated firmly, with no concern for economies of scale that could 
potentially be achieved through interorganizational management of business tasks.  The scope of the 
decisions made by managers in this type of channel arrangement is characterised basically by 
tradition and experience.  Vertical marketing systems, on the other hand, are professionally 
managed, centrally programmed networks.  By rationalizing activities through a strategy of vertical 
integration, coordination and synchronization of marketing flows from points of production to 
points of consumption, accompanied by massive capital investments, such systems can achieve 
economies of scale by using the most appropriate technology, management techniques and 
marketing strategies so as to ensure their viability and continuity. 
 
 Vertical marketing systems can be divided into three types:  administered systems, 
contractual systems and corporate systems.  In administered vertical marketing systems, vertical 
coordination is provided through particular programs geared to such systems.  Traditionally, they 
are associated with a manufacturer-retailer trading relationship, where the manufacturer offers 
retailers marketing programs for its products (McCammon, 1970; Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan, 
1995).  However, this type of system also exists in the wholesaler-independent unaffiliated retailer 
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some of the wholesaler's services are offered to such retailers (Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan, 
1995; Robicheaux and Coleman, 1994).  The services are generally of a kind that will improve the 
activities and marketing of the retailers.  However, the potential economies of scale in such a 
relationship are minimal.  Investments are made mainly by the system leader, i.e. the wholesaler, to 
improve its own productivity and financial performance.  The leader's expertise in management and 
marketing will provide the system with a certain continuity and viability, although at a fairly low 
level, given the leader's lack of control over the channel members and the possibility for the 
members, if they so wish, to buy from other food distributors. 
 
 In contractual vertical marketing systems, the production, wholesale or retail function 
coordinates its business activities by means of a contractual agreement and a desire to cooperate 
through a comprehensive marketing program.  This latter element leads to rationalization and 
formalization of exchange procedures, leading in turn to major savings in commercial operations.  
Moreover, investments are made in production, wholesaling or retailing to support the cost 
rationalization strategy in the distribution system.  The managers are skilled in the management of 
marketing function activities, and the system's viability depends on the contractual agreement 
setting out the terms binding the two parties. 
 
 In corporate vertical marketing systems, the production, wholesale or retail functions are 
subjected to the same financial control.  The economies of scale available in such systems are 
generated by division and tight coordination of trading tasks.  Therefore, ownership at one or more 
levels ensures coordination and control of marketing activities.  In addition, investments are made 
to reduce the system's distribution costs, whether for the wholesale or retail function.  The 
managerial and marketing skills of the managers ensure a certain continuity and viability for the 
system.    
 
 Since all distribution systems are both economic and political (Palamountain, 1955; Stern 
and Reve, 1980; Robicheaux and Coleman, 1994), the political economy framework can be used to 
identify the internal dimensions that characterize their management modes and functional structure. 
More specifically, the internal economic structure describes and analyzes the level of vertical 
integration between the organizations or business units making up the distribution channel.  The 
internal economic process is concerned with the interorganizational management of marketing 
functions and activities in the system.  Internal polity is defined according to its structure, which 
highlights the relationship of power and dependency between the partners of the distribution 
channel.  The internal polity process expresses the interorganizational climate that characterizes 




 Empirically, as shown in Figure 1, marketing researchers have modified the internal 
political economy framework so that it can be used on samples of respondents from distribution 
channels (Dwyer and Oh, 1987; Dwyer and Welsh, 1985; Reve, 1980; John and Reve, 1982).  
Essentially, constructs are grouped under the headings of transactional form and interorganizational 
climate and are defined in Table 1.  Transactional form is a representation of the internal economic 
and political structure and the internal economic process.  In this research, it is defined through 
centralization and formalization, and is directly linked to the vertical coordination of vertical 
marketing systems (Reve 1980; Brown 1981; Robbins, Speh and Mayer 1982; Eliashberg and 
Michie 1984; Schul, Little Jr. and Pride 1985; Dwyer and Oh 1987, 1988). The question of interest 
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FIGURE 1 
Empirical model of the internal political economy of vertical marketing systems 
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 H1 : As integration increases among the different vertical marketing systems, 
centralization will increase. 
 
 H2 : As integration increases among the different vertical marketing systems, 
formalization will increase. 
 The theory of vertical marketing systems and the literature on political economy support 
these hypotheses (Anderson and Weitz, 1986; Hansen, 1965; Hansen and Harvey, 1974; 
McCammon, 1970; Stern and Reve, 1980; Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan, 1995).  In fact, the 
shift from a market structure to a vertically integrated structure is followed by a change in the 
level of centralization and formalization of the exchange procedures.  The locus of decision and 
authority in corporate vertical marketing systems lies at the pinnacle of the hierarchical structure. 
 The consequence of this is that decision-making is centralized at the head offices of the 
corporate chains.  On the other hand, the level of centralization is not as high in contractual and 
administered vertical marketing systems.  The informal structure of the division of labour in 
administered systems, together with the low level of vertical integration, mean that decision-
making power is in the hands of the independent unaffiliated retailers.  In contractual vertical 
marketing systems, however, under the agreement between the wholesaler and the retailer, 
decision-making control tends to be much more centralized, although less so than in corporate 
vertical marketing systems.  The locus of decision-making lies at the top of the structure, that is, 
at the level of the wholesale function, although decisions must be ratified by the retailers, who 
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 TABLE 1  
Definitions of transactional form and interorganizational climate constructs within the internal 
political economy framework 
 Transactional form 
 Constructs  Definition of construct 
1. Centralization Degree of retailers` perception on their autonomy to make and implement 
marketing decisions such as promotion, merchandising and purchasing. 
2. Formalization Degree of retailers` perception on the routinization of administrative procedures, 
logistical activities and flows of information. 
 Interorganizational climate 
3. Goal 
compatibility 
Degree of retailers` perception that market and marketing objectives are coherent 
to the ones pursued by their wholesalers. 
4. Domain 
consensus 
Degree of retailers` perception regarding mutual responsibilities with their 
wholesalers to the implementation of marketing programs. 
5. Evaluation of 
accomplishment 
Degree of retailers` perception to the extent of accomplishment of distributive 
activities by their wholesalers. 
6. Norms of 
exchange 




 As regards formalization, fully integrated wholesale-retail distribution structures have 
highly coordinated, very simple and highly standardized distribution activities and exchanges 
(Hansen, 1965; Hansen and Harvey, 1974; Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan 1995).  This 
dimension of the transactional form is directly related to the level of vertical integration between 
wholesaling and retailing.  As a result, the level of formalization will be low in administered 
systems and moderate in contractual systems.  Empirically, the work of Brown (1981) and Dwyer 
and Oh (1988) also suggest this type of relationship, although in the latter case corporate chains 
were not considered in the empirical analysis. 
 
 The level of vertical coordination between the wholesale and retail functions is directly 
related to the interorganizational climate in the distribution system - that is, goal compatibility 
domain consensus, evaluation of accomplishment and norms of exchange (Stern and Reve, 
1980).  The following hypotheses are tested : 
 
 H3 : As integration increases among the different vertical marketing systems, goal 
compatibility will increase. 
 
 H4 : As integration increases among the different vertical marketing systems, domain 
consensus will increase. 
 
 H5 : As integration increases among the different vertical marketing systems, 
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 H6 : As integration increases among the different vertical marketing systems, norms 
of exchange will increase. 
 These hypotheses are based mainly on the vertical marketing systems literature and the 
theoretical framework of political economy in marketing (Alderson, 1965; Hansen and Harvey, 
1974; McCammon, 1970; Reve and Stern, 1979; Stern, 1969; Stern and Reve, 1980; Stern, El-
Ansary and Coughlan, 1995; Williamson, 1975, 1985).  In fact, the control systems are stricter 
and tighter in corporate vertical marketing systems, which help reduce opportunist behaviour 
contrary to the system's objectives and increase transaction costs. Thus, corporate vertical 
marketing systems generally have more goal compatibility, a better definition of their domain of 
responsibilities, greater satisfaction with the result of accomplishment and a better understanding 
of the system norms of exchange.  However, system's coordination effort tends to decline in a 
quasi-integration or non-vertical wholesale-retail integration structure.  Such channel 
arrangements leave greater freedom of action to the parties, who may find themselves in a system 
that does not meet the individual and shared goals of its members, in which roles and tasks are 
poorly defined, where satisfaction with the result is generally lower, and which does not comply 
as well with exchange standards and procedures.  These hypotheses are supported empirically by 
the work of Wiek (1969), Robbins, Speh and Mayer (1982), Eliashberg and Michie (1984), and 
Schule, Little Jr. and Pride (1985).  All these authors tend to show that, as the level of vertical 
integration in a distribution structure increases, the level of conflict decreases, leading to greater 
goal compatibility and domain consensus, and increased satisfaction with the result of 
accomplishment.  To a lesser extent, the work of Reve (1980) and Dwyer and Oh (1987) 
produced empirical support for the relationship between level of formalization and 
interorganizational climate.  However, these latter authors also found a negative or inverse 
relationship between level of centralization and interorganizational climate.  In this study, we 
will test the positive and direct relationship between level of vertical integration and 






 The research seeks to test for differences between corporate, contractual and administered 
vertical marketing systems in Quebec's food retail distribution industry.  The data were collected by 
means of a structured mail questionnaire through a key informant approach (Dillman, 1978).  
Owners of independent supermarkets  and managers of corporate supermarkets stores were asked to 
complete the questionnaire. 
 
 We followed Churchill's (1979) advice for developing better measures and to assess 
reliability and validity of each of the constructs. The questionnaire was pre-tested for content 
validity through personal interview as recommended by Dillman (1978) with wholesale executives 
and store owners and managers of supermarkets within the different vertical market structure under 
study. One of the challenges of the research was to draw up a list of supermarkets that was as 
representative as possible of Quebec's food retail distribution industry in order to minimize 
exclusion error, i.e. exclusion of potential respondents from the sample list.  As our sample 
population, we used the list of grocer-butcher permits issued by Quebec's Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food.  Access to the corporate stores listing and affiliates of all the major companies 
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obtained in arriving at our final list.  We obtained a final list of 2,212 grocers/butchers : 150 
corporate stores under corporate names such as Provigo, Héritage, Maxi, Super C and Sobeys; 
1,244 affiliates, the main banners being Métro, IGA, Provigo, Richelieu and Bonichoix; and 818 
unaffiliated stores.  We then proceeded by sampling affiliated and unaffiliated stores for the 
research, together with the list of corporate stores.  In the case of the affiliates, one store in every 
two was selected, for a final list of 622.  In the case of the unaffiliated stores, three out of four were 
selected, for a total of 613.  For the corporate stores, we retained all 150 from the list of 
respondents.  As a result, 1,385 questionnaires were mailed for data collection purposes. 
 
 To avoid a low participation rate among questionnaire recipients, we adopted the integrated 
mail survey approach developed by Dillman (1978). The overall response rate obtained in this way 
was 32%.  This compares favourably with other mail surveys, although it is below the anticipated 
rate of 59% as suggested by Dillman (1978, p. 56).  However, if we look at responses per 
respondent group, we observe that the highest response rate was obtained from the corporate stores 
(60%), followed by the affiliates (43.5%) and finally, the non-affiliates (12.9%).  The high rate of 
participation among corporate store managers can be explained by the support received from the 
head offices.  The affiliate rate is extremely satisfactory if compared with the rates generally 
obtained in mail surveys (± 25%).  However, the comparatively low response rate among non-
affiliated stores is probably due to a lack of interest or time in completing the questionnaire.  Non 
respondents were not analyzed.  However, a chi-square analysis of the respondents` geographical 
location with their correspondent population revealed no significant difference (non affiliated χ2 = 
8.46; affiliated χ2 = 6.32; corporate χ2 = 2.985 for α = 0.01 and 3 d.f.).  Therefore, we can conclude 
on the external validity of the study. 
 
 Respondents were asked to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale the extent of channel 
practices. Then, an inter-item correlation was used to purify the measurement scale for each 
construct  All variables obtaining a correlation coefficient below 0.30 were eliminated from the 
scale.  The statements were then subjected to principal component analysis to test construct 
validity (Churchill, 1979).  As a guideline, a value in excess of 1 was used as the selection 
criterion for the factorial structure. Two factors were identified for formalization and norms of 
exchange by this process, giving a bivariate dimension to both concepts.  Formalizaion is 
achieved by the process of routinization of common administrative procedures  (i.e. transactional 
formalization) such as billing, ordering, receiving and by used of communication systems (i.e. 
exchanges computerization) such as electronic data interchange (EDI) and electronic courier (E-
mail newsletters). The bi-dimensionality of norms of exchange was no surprise since by 
definition the construct is a representation of cooperation and trust between food retailers and 
wholesalers.  Internal consistency was then analyzed using Cronbach's Alpha (α) to ensure the 
reliability of the scale.  A factorial score was then calculated for each concept and each 
respondent, to compare the vertical marketing systems (Spector, 1992). The convergent and 
discriminant validity was analyzed using the correlation matrix between the operational concepts 
(Kim and Mueller, 1978; Spector, 1992).  The reliability coefficient was placed on the diagonal 
of the matrix (TABLE 2).  Basically, this procedure showed whether or not the statements for 
each construct measured by the reliability coefficient were more strongly correlated with the 
factor (convergent validity) and less strongly with the separate concepts (discriminant validity). 
The correlation coefficients between goal compatibility, domain consensus and cooperation were 
close to the Cronbach Alpha coefficient value for goal compatibility and, to a lesser extent, for 
domain consensus.  This was no surprise, because John and Reve (1982) also experienced 






28th Annual Atlantic Schools of Business Conference 9 
First, the statements for the concepts may not measure the conceptual field very clearly.  This, 
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obtained for each concept, and the high correlation between the statements and the factors.  It is 
also possible that respondents were not able to estimate the statements properly for the retail 
trade.  This is also unlikely, given the efforts made to pretest the questionnaire so as to ensure 
that the questions were clear and easily understood.  In fact, the problem is likely to be 
conceptual in nature (John and Reve, 1982).  Goal compatibility and domain consensus  are two 
dimensions of conflict, and therefore of the same construct.  Moreover, although theoretically 
speaking conflict and cooperation are not part of the same continuum, the results suggest 
otherwise.  Consequently, the factorial analysis shows the extent to which these operational 
concepts re related, and that it is difficult to obtain measures that will satisfy all the conditions 
for validity.  Nevertheless, these concepts were retained for analysis, although we were careful to 
ensure that the results were interpreted in light of their low level of divergence in terms of 
construct validity. 
 
 The results were analyzed and processed on the VAX system using the SPSS statistical 
data analysis software package (Version 4).  A multiple variance analysis (Manova) was carried out 
on the internal variables of the vertical marketing systems, i.e. on the transactional form and 
interorganizational climate variables.  If there is a significant difference with the univariate test, it is 
possible, using simple variance analysis, to compare the means of the groups in order to discover 
which does not correspond to the values of the other groups under study.  A number of comparison 
procedures exist, the most common being the tests of Scheffé, Tukey, Duncan and Newman-Kuels. 
 The aim of all these procedures is to control type 1 errors during multiple comparisons of variable 
means.  In this research, we used Scheffé's paired test because of its robustness and its results, 
which are known to be more conservative (Duncan, 1975; Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989). 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 We can therefore conclude that there is a significant difference in the internal political 
economy of the various vertical marketing systems (TABLE 3).  Univariate analysis of each of the 
concepts provided information on the nature of the differences between the vertical marketing 
systems under study.  It revealed that all the empirical measures used to describe transactional form 
and interorganizational climate in the empirical model were significant at the threshold of α = 0.05. 
 Consequently, the results seem to confirm hypotheses 1 to 6.  Scheffé's two-by-two comparison 
process, applied to the vertical marketing systems at the level α = 0.05, revealed significant 
differences in centralization, exchange computerization, goal compatibility, domain consensus and 
cooperation.  However, no significant difference was found in the level of trust, and only partial 
difference was found for transactional formalization and evaluation of accomplishment. 
 
 In fact, our results support a separate transactional form for voluntary groups, corporate 
chains and unaffiliated retailers as suggested by vertical marketing systems theory.  The structure, 
characterized by the concepts of centralization, transactional formalization and exchange 
computerization, varies with the level of vertical integration between the wholesale and retail 












Multivariate and univariate analyses (MANOVA) of the internal political economy 
of vertical marketing systems 
Multivariate Test of Significance 
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 Degrees of Freedom  Significance 




 of F statistic 
Pillais  0,71756  24,61928  16  704  0,000 
Hotellings  1,19236  26,08286  16  700  0,000 
Wilks  0,40172  25,34869  16  702  0,000 
 Univariate Test of significance 


















(α = 0,05) 
(Anova) 
Centralization  0,00171  0,00361  0,00086  0,00001 84,82154  0,000 1>2>3 
Transactional Formalization  0,08230  0,30028  0,04115  0,00084 49,06094  0,000 1=2>3 
Exchange computerization  8,72713  24,45066  4,36357  0,06830 63,89017  0,000 1>2>3 
Goal compatibility  6,86579  21,27498  3,43289  0,05943 57,76626  0,000 1>2>3 
Domain consensus  10,99738  18,42552  5,49869  0,05147 106,83717  0,000 1>2>3 









Cooperation  10,24180  19,83882  5,12090  0,05542 92,40880  0,000 1>2>3 
Trust  0,02054  0,99298  0,01027  0,00277 3,70242  0,026 1=2=3 









formalization, where the corporate systems have the same level of perception as the retailers in 
administered systems.  Consequently, the highest level of trade formalization is found in 
voluntary groups.  In the other cases, the higher the level of vertical integration, the higher the 
level of centralization and exchange computerization.  Also, a direct link was found between 
vertical integration and goal compatibility, domain consensus and cooperation.  There is also a 
significant difference in terms of evaluation of accomplishment between retailers affiliated with 
voluntary groups and unaffiliated retailers.  This same difference, however, is not significant 
between corporate chains and affiliated retailers, or between corporate chains and unaffiliated 
retailers.  Consequently, the level of accomplishment is highest among retailers belonging to 
voluntary groupings.  Finally, there is no significant difference in the level of trust between 
managers of chain stores, affiliated retailers and unaffiliated retailers. 
 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 Our work has revealed the differences in the organization and functioning of administered, 
contractual and corporate vertical marketing systems in grocery distribution in the province of 
Quebec.  As a result, we were also able to highlight conceptual developments in the management of 
distribution channels (Ardnt 1979; Stern and Reve 1980; Achrol, Reve and Stern 1983;  Williamson 
1975, 1985).  The work was also useful in testing the measurement instruments used in previous 
research. The reliability coefficients almost all obtained scores in excess of those quoted in the 
literature, and when compared to the standards generally considered acceptable for exploratory 
research, they all achieved the minimum pass standard (Nunnally 1967). 
 
 In term of managerial implications, this research shows significant differences in retailers’ 
perceptions within the different channel structure.  Since most grocery distributors are governing or 
managing these different vertical marketing systems within their own organization, knowing these 
differences may help grocery distributors in developping appropriate strategy with their food 
retailers in order to achieve their market objectives.  For instance, unaffiliated food retailers need 
wholesaler’s expertise in management and marketing.  But this can only be accomplish through a 
partnership kind of relationship since the final decision is made by the store owner.  Affiliated store 
or contractual vertical marketing systems are less autonomous.  The danger for grocery distributor 
is to manage them as if there were corporate vertical marketing systems and forgetting in the 
process that they are first in business for themselves. Therefore, the contractual agreement should 
specify the roles and responsibilities of both parties in terms of management, operational and 
marketing responsibilities.  Entrepreneurial values are still important as shown by the degree of 
centralization in marketing decisions.  Corporate vertical marketing systems are managed in order 
to achieve the greatest  operational efficiencies.  However, the standardization of operational 
procedures leave little room to store managers in terms of  autonomy.  This lack of flexibility, as 
perceived by store manager, may inhibit local initiatives to meet more adequately consumer 
demand. 
 
 The study points out to a number of possible avenues for future research.  First, a different 
focus on channel participants other than retailers, would be interesting, for example on food 
processors.  Second, vertical marketing systems are common in almost all retail sectors.  Thus, it 
would be possible to carry out a study in a sector other than food to validate the results for the retail 
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